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INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS
1. My generation, and the one or two generations preceding mine, 
were brought up in a world of international relations. A world, that 
is to say, where the State had acquired a monopoly of foreign rela­
tions. The monopoly of course was not a complete one. Transnational 
relations went on all the time, but the world I am referring to was 
used to considering as a natural state of affairs a pyramid of power 
at the top of which stood the State. Transnational relations took 
place but were subject to the approval or were even planned by the 
State at government or specialized agency level.
Still, if we lengthen our historical perspective somewhat, we can 
immediately see that this pyramid of power which culminated with the 
State, had not been the normal state of affairs for more than one 
century. Scholars with a more developed sense of history knew this 
very well. However, they thought that an irreversible process had 
been set in motion, and that the monopoly of the state over foreign 
relations would inevitably increase as time pressed. The drive to 
internationalize transnational relations was considered irreversible.
The decades which have followed the Second World War have wit­
nessed, however, the opposite phenomenon. The drive to international­
ization has been, at least for what concerns the large industrial 
countries, firmly reversed and an opposite process of transnational­
ization has started again. It has proceeded unabated for more than 
three decades. It has been so strong that a generation younger than 





























































































The events of the last five years, however, have made this pros­
pect much less certain. I think that we are at a cross-road. We can 
expect, for the next decade, a reassertion of international relations 
and we can, equally reaonably, expect a renewed process of transna­
tionalization. I favour the first outcome as the most likely, and I 
will do my best to explain why I think so focussing on the subject I 
know best, which is international banking.
First of all, however, I will describe the transnationalization 
of world banking which has occurred since the nineteen sixties, and 
which has involved, more and more heavily, the main banks of the large 
industrial countries.
As I have said before, the 60 years preceding the Second World 
War had seen the opposite process take wing. Banks had been asked, 
induced, even urged, by States to organize a network of foreign ope­
rations. The history of foreign banking in Italy since the unifi­
cation of the country in 1860 is an extremely good example. French 
banks, and in particular the Credit Mobilier, had been asked by the 
French Government, also at the insistence of the Italian Government, 
to start operations in Italy. This happened in the 1860s and 1870s. 
After the crash of the Italian banking system in the 1880s, the Ita­
lian Government asked the German Government to persuade the large 
German banks to start operations in Italy, which happened in the 
1890s. German large banks and the Deutsche Bank in particular, had 
been created by the Imperial Reich anyway, set up with the declaredly 
mercantilistic objective of furthering German trade and German power.
The drive to make banks an important instrument of foreign policy 
was so powerful in the decades before the First World War, that it 
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transnationalism, with the power of the city of London being much 
greater than that of the State.
British financial institutions, especially the most traditional 
ones, the merchant banks and the Bank of England, had identified their 
private gains with the interests of the British nation at large. They 
had pushed for free trade and free international financial relations 
even when the best interest of Britain would have required something 
radically different.
However, as the European powers, and the German Reich in parti­
cular, had started to entertain global policy objectives in the two 
decades before the First World War, British bankers had begun to 
experience heavier pressure to help her Majesty's Government in the 
enforcement of its foreign policy objectives. Their faith in trans­
nationalism was so strong, however, that only in a few cases the 
Government had been able to persuade them to become an economic arm of 
British foreign policy. To this day, I may add, the transnational­
ization of British banks has remained unabashed and the precipitous 
decline of the British economy can be, and has been, attributed to the 
continuous capacity, on the part of the British financial institu­
tions, to impose on the Government their view, that in a nutshell 
consists in thinking that banking serves the purpose of sending money 
wherever in the world there is the most profitable chance of investing 
it. And that British national interest can only coincide with the 
profit maximizing activities of the city of London.
After the First World War, the two inter-war decades have wit­
nessed the strongest affirmation of the international model of foreign 
relations that the world has ever experienced. The monopoly of the 
State over foreign relations has been extended to include, for the 
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statesman like Bismarck to include. This has meant that financial 
relations and foreign banking operations were subjected to State 
supervision in order to make them more and more an instrument of the 
foreign policy objectives of the State. This was a direct consequence 
of the economic facets of the concept of total war, a concept that 
emerged and was practised on a large scale only during the First World 
War.
A partial exception to this tendency was represented by the 
drive to establish foreign operations experienced in the first half of 
this period by large American banks. Because of the peculiar distri­
bution of power in American society, this drive can be seen as an 
experiment in transnationalism. But it could equally well be seen as 
another case of the prevalence of the international model of foreign 
relations in the inter-war period. I think both models apply in this 
case - U.S. banks had genuine profit-maximization in mind when they 
sought to establish foreign operations. They would have done it even 
in the face of the Government. But it was also the case that the U.S. 
Government had a continuous strategy to wrest the primacy in foreign 
relations away from Britain and recognized the importance of the 
foreign operations of U.S. banks to accomplish this strategy.
In the event, however, the transnational model can be said to 
have prevailed in the twenties with American banks overstretching 
themselves in foreign operations and in sovereign lending in parti­
cular, and then withdrawing from foreign lending to speculate on Wall 
Street or to lend to Wall Street speculators at the end of the decade. 
This sudden withdrawal from foreign lending cannot in any way be 
considered an act of foreign policy conceived by the U.S. Government. 
It occurred in the pursuit of profit maximization and it had conse­
quences which in no way can be said to have been beneficial to the 
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The crisis of 1929 and the European banking panic of 1931, 
followed by the U.S. panics of 1932 and 1933 were a direct result of 
the prevalence of unfettered transnationalism on the part of U.S. 
banks.
Transnationalism, by definition, must be the pursuit of a micro­
goal, either economic or political, by a non-State political-economic 
agent in the world arena. American banks when they lent greater and 
greater sums abroad and floated an avalanche of foreign bonds on the 
U.S. market had mostly their balance sheets and their market share in 
mind. The same goals motivated them when they abruptly retracted from 
the world market at the end of the twenties. There just was more 
money to be made lending to Wall Street brokers than to German cities 
or Latin American Governments.
The transnational behaviour of American banks in the twenties can 
be said to have made the move to a completely international model of 
foreign relations more inevitable in the 1930s for the world as a 
whole, including the United States. More than that, they can be said 
to have done more than any other force to bring about the realization, 
in most countries, of wide State controls over the functioning of the 
domestic economic systems. State control over the economy had become 
extensive during the First World War. But, at the end of the con­
flict, most people, in most countries, had shown a desire to see less 
of that. The transnational behaviour of the U.S. banks in the twen­
ties, and the world chaos and depression which it caused, rendered the 
possibility of a return to laisser faire totally anachronistic and 
legitimized Keynesianism in England, the New Deal in the U.S. and the 
totalitarian control of the economy in Germany, Italy and Japan. As a 
result of the world crisis, Mussolini switched from liberalism, which 
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In the United States, as well as in other industrial countries, 
laws were passed in the 1930s to reform the banking system which were 
uniformly inspired by the consciousness that banks, if left to behave 
freely, would sooner or later induce a financial crisis and would have 
to be rescued, as they had been at the beginning of the 1930s. This 
possibility was exorcised by extensive banking regulation, which 
reached its acme in the United States. It is worth noting that the 
only country where financial institutions escaped regulation in the 
1930s was Great Britain. This is another example of the City's 
masterly control of British politics. All the critics of banks in 
Britain got in the 1930s was the Macmillan Report, which anyway ended 
up by attributing torts to both banks and industry.
2. The banking reforms of the Roosevelt years effectively segmented 
the United States financial market and left the large "money center" 
banks without much prospect for growth. Ironically, the only field 
that remained open to them to plough was that of foreign operations, 
which was the one where their actions had been most destabilising for 
the world economy. Throughout the second half of the 1930s, and the 
war years, the U.S. large banks experienced an enormous inflow of 
foreign deposits, owned by people who fled a Europe ridden by war and 
totalitarian regimes. This helped the large U.S. banks considerably, 
as they had been effectively cut off from the U.S. inter-bank deposit 
market by the flood of war-bonds floated by the U.S. Government to 
finance the War, which were absorbed by provincial banks and other 
financial institutions.
At the end of the War, foreign operations being the only growth 
prospect open to U.S. large banks, they had to make sure that the 





























































































the realization of those prospects possible. U.S. large banks thus 
fought a stubborn and in the end successful battle against people like 
Keynes and Harry Dexter White, who had very different plans for the 
world financial system.
They sought to reorganize the latter according to a clear model 
of international financial relations, where private short-term capital 
movements could be free to help, but prevented from harming the growth 
of national economies. The original Keynes and White plans had pro­
visions for full control of unwanted capital flows.
The final plan for the establishment of the International Mone­
tary Fund, however, after the U.S. banks had exercised their influ­
ence, turned out to be very different. There was in it no clause 
compelling receiving countries to return short-term capital flows to 
the countries whence they came. There was no provision for an inter­
national Central Bank, which would be able to create public interna­
tional liquidity and distribute it among countries. Thus, with the 
darkening of detente prospects in Europe and the start of the cold 
war, a new flood of money invaded the U.S. directed mainly to the 
large banks, of course, as Europeans tried to remove at least their 
money from countries which could become communist any day. The 
Marshall Plan was launched to balance this flow with one in the 
opposite direction. The same result, of course, would have been 
obtained if the appropriate clauses contained in the Keynes and White 
Plans had been maintained. But those would have put an automatic 
system into action whereby the funds would simply be returned to the 
countries of origin. The Marshall Plan was, on the contrary, a system 
of aid, tied to the purchase of U.S. made goods. It was an immensely 
successful operation, which had a huge propaganda effect in Europe, 
helped U.S. industry and agriculture and solved the world's payments 
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Thus a compromise was found by which the foreign economic policy 
of the U.S. could be kept within the international model and U.S. 
large banks were left free to manage their transnational model of 
foreign financial operations.
The powerful drive to increase foreign operations came to large 
U.S. banks from the static situation of the U.S. domestic money mar­
ket. Large banks are the principal source of credit of large U.S. 
corporations, and, like other large banks in the main industrial 
countries, can usually lend more than they are able to get as deposits 
from the public through their branch network. The huge presence of 
U.S. Government bonds and the banking reforms of the Roosevelt years 
prevented them, however, from making up their deficit of loanable 
funds on the U.S. interbank market. The stifling regulatory envi­
ronment also prevented them from competing for funds by bidding up the 
deposit rate they gave their customers.
While in the late 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s, foreign deposits 
had been an extremely important source of loanable funds for large 
U.S. banks, this source dried up with political and economic stabi­
lization in Europe. The main source of dynamism then becomes, in the 
early 1960s, the enormous wave of U.S. investments abroad, which had 
Europe as its centre.
We have now almost forgotten that the late 1950s and early 60s 
were in the United States years of industrial maturity and stagnation. 
The phase of growth based on automobiles, motorways, and consumer 
durables had come to its limit. With the dollar remaining high­
valued, but every day nearer to a devaluation, with a progressive 
government coming into power under John Kennedy, there were powerful 
incentives for U.S. capital to emigrate, especially to Europe. There, 
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American large banks were ready to follow large U.S. corporations 
in their drive to multinationalize. A renewed battle for market 
shares soon broke out as large banks competed for those corporations' 
international deposits. Both banks and multinational corporations soon 
discovered that a very lucrative game could be played, by engaging in 
one-way speculation against currencies which were tied to parities 
fixed under the Bretton Woods system. Central banks had to defend 
these parities, and speculators could not lose.
The Kennedy-Johnson years were thus characterized by massive mi­
gration of American capital abroad, and by repeated and powerful at­
tacks against the dollar parity, mounted by the treasurers of American 
multinationals with the indispensable help of the large American 
banks. So powerful were those speculative attacks that they induced a 
series of measures by the American Government, aimed at restricting 
the freedom of capital movements. These measures however, were 
adopted always trying to get the highest possible measure of approval 
from bankers, i.e., from the very people against whom they should have 
been aimed. They inevitably achieved results which provided no solu­
tion to the problem, but only managed to shift the problem itself to 
another dimension.
I shall analyse one of the most important examples of this beha­
viour in one minute. Before that, however, it is worth pausing to ask 
why the U.S. Government acted so feebly. The most obvious answer is 
that large banks and multinational corporations are powerful pressure 
groups, whose open enmity cannot be endured for too long even by an 
Administration with massive popular backing. But there is another 
answer. The Government of the United States, like that of other large 
industrial countries, has got used to furthering its foreign policy 
objectives through the actions of large banks and multinationals. The 





























































































national model of foreign relations by demanding, from time to time, 
that those transnational actors, large banks and corporations, adopt 
certain types of behaviour, which help the American foreign policy 
stance vis-à-vis certain countries. If the Government adopted at the 
same time measures directly punitive towards large banks and companies 
it could not ask them to help the conduct of American foreign policy 
by their collaborative action. Hence the inconsistent behaviour of 
the Democratic Administrations with respect to the problem of inter­
national financial speculation.
A good example of this inconsistency is provided by the Voluntary 
Credit Restraint Program, adopted in 1965. This constrained foreign 
lending from the home offices of U.S. banks. Up to then U.S. banks 
had lent abroad directly from the U.S., thus posing increasing pro­
blems for the U.S. balance of payments. As a result of the V.C.R. 
program, banks were allowed to lend abroad funds which they had 
acquired through their foreign branches.
After the Suez crisis of 1956, British banks had been subjected 
to similar constraints. However, the restrictions extended to all 
financing of non-British customers with sterling denominated loans. 
British banks had reacted by attracting dollar-denominated foreign 
deposits, thus giving impetus to the Euro-dollar market.
The American VCR program, however, did not prevent American banks 
from lending abroad in dollars. It only prevented them from lending 
abroad from their U.S. balance sheets. As a result, American banks 
began a massive drive to open foreign branches. In some cases these 
were genuine foreign branches, collecting genuine foreign dollar 
deposits. But in a large number of cases the opening of a foreign 
branch only meant that the home office of an American bank would open 
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balance sheet in New York. On the liability side of this balance 
sheet the bank would put all deposits it received from sources 
outside the U.S., on the asset side it would put loans and other 
investments. Thus the bank would run in New York two balance sheets, 
side by side. One, of its U.S. operations, subject to U.S. banking 
regulations and to U.S. taxes. The other, of its "Bahamas opera­
tions", subject only to Bahamas fiscal, legal and banking require­
ments, which were very close to non-existence.
By the VCR program, the U.S. Government had thus renounced its 
sovereignty on a large share of total financial transactions taking 
place in New York and other U.S. money centres and involving mostly, 
if not exclusively, American citizens and American Banks.
This solution, moreover, not only posed sovereignty problems. It 
also did not facilitate the conduct of U.S. monetary policy. In 1969, 
for instance, when the U.S. Government tried to stem the inflationary 
impact of the Vietnam War on the U.S. economy by a restrictive mone­
tary policy, U.S. banks reacted by borrowing massively from their 
"foreign" balance sheets. There were, in fact, no rules to prevent 
banks from borrowing from their "foreign" offices.
Thus, about 14 billion dollars were passed from the foreign to 
the domestic balance sheets of U.S. large banks and lent to large U.S. 
corporations. This prolonged the tight money period in the U.S., as 
the Fed had to depress housing and other sectors in order to balance 
the refusal by large corporations to accept the credit squeeze in the 
way we have mentioned. The Fed tried to remedy the situation by 
imposing a 10% marginal reserve requirement on additional borrowing 
from foreign branches. But it also recognised that the large banks 
had enjoyed an unfair advantage and allowed more and more U.S. banks 
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The year after, 1970, the American credit market slumped and 
large funds were shifted back to the "foreign" balance sheets of U.S. 
banks. Those funds were used to speculate against the dollar, as 
foreign banks borrowed Euro-dollars from U.S. banks' "foreign" 
branches and transformed them into other currencies. As is known, 
under the pressure of these speculative attacks, the dollar was 
devalued in 1971. Most large industrial countries then decided to 
impose exchange restrictions. But those restrictions were easily 
by-passed. The foreign branches of U.S. banks borrowed foreign 
currency deposits in the international inter-bank market, which was 
not subject to exchange controls, and re-loaned the funds to specu­
lators who could not acquire the funds directly from European banks. 
They also swapped balances for customers who could not get funds out 
of their countries, and helped those customers who could not get funds 
into their countries by selling deposits to the domestic inter-bank 
market or by acquiring deposits from domestic banks. As a result, 
dollars again flowed into the coffers of European Central Banks, in 
spite of their exchange controls. The dollar had again to be devalued, 
under the pressure of speculation, in 1973.
In 1973 there was a real explosion of the foreign branch ac­
tivities of U.S. banks. Their assets rose by 56% while the number of 
foreign banks, finance, and leasing affiliates owned by U.S. banks 
rose from 416 in 1971 to 1670 companies in 1973.
This-over extension could not fail to have traumatic effects.
These occurred in 1974 with the secondary banking crisis in Great 
Britain, the Herstatt and Franklin National Bank failures in Germany 
and in the United States.
In the U.S. recession of 1975, $20 billion were again shifted 
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This prevented U.S. interest rates from falling and prolonged the U.S. 
recession. It also undoubtedly strengthened the downward pressure on 
the dollar exchange rate. Where did the money go this time? It went 
to solve the balance of payments problems of countries which were 
struggling with giant oil deficits.
3. The drive to transnational banking I have sketched above started 
in the United States as a way for the largest U.S. banks of getting 
round very dim growth prospects at home. As a result of the excesses 
of the 1920s, to which I have also referred above, in the 1930s, ex­
tensive regulation of banking took place in the major industrial 
countries and particularly in the U.S. Regulation was so devised as to 
considerably restrict the field of domestic operations of large banks, 
particularly of U.S. large banks. Ironically, the only field where 
they were left free to expand was the international field and large 
banks were busy, even in the late 30s, attracting foreign deposits.
They were also extremely interested, and successful, in making sure 
that the world financial system be rebuilt in a way which would permit 
transnational financial operations to take place on a large scale.
The alternative model of rebuilding the world financial system ac­
cording to a purely international model of financial relations, 
sponsored by Keynes and White, was discarded.
As the long post-war boom extended from the midfifties into the 
sixties and early seventies, large banks all over the developed world 
were induced, with the help of national authorities, to expand their 
transnational operations.
The international inter-bank market, for instance, was developed, 




























































































accumulating in their official reserves in the long era of dollar 
semi-inconvertibility, which lasted over a decade. Large European 
and Japanese banks were given very attractive swap contracts by their 
central banks, so that they could dump dollars on the interbank market 
without running the currency risk, which was picked up by the Central 
banks. Foreign operations of large banks were also favoured by Euro­
pean and Japanese authorities as a way to return to large banks part 
of the competitive edge taken away by restrictive banking regulation.
Regulation had, in fact, diminished the large banks' capacity to 
grow, but the long post-war boom had induced the fast growth of large 
industrial corporations, the traditional clients of large banks. 
Industrial giants like Siemens, G.M., Mitsubishi, Fiat, Saint Gobain, 
could not solve the problem by getting the finance, which they needed 
to operate, from smaller banks. This could be done to some extent, 
but industrial credit on a large scale can only efficiently come from 
large banks. The problem of the relative size of lender and borrower 
is just one of the problems involved.
As a result, as I have mentioned above, the growth of trans­
national banking was favoured by national authorities, who, at the 
same time, however, started to become more and more painfully aware of 
the loss of control and stability for world economic relations that 
this involved.
With a decade of dollar devaluation, in the 1970s, the trans­
national operations of non-American large banks were naturally fa­
voured. European and Japanese banking is a very concentrated busi­
ness, and the strength of those countries' currencies added compe­
titive power to these giants in the transnational market. Today, the 
relative share of the total transnational banking market held by U.S. 
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are speaking of a very small total number of giant banks, this loss of 
relative weight on the part of U.S. banks has decreased, rather than 
increased, the relative stability of the world financial system. It 
has meant that the powers of the Federal Reserve to control the market 
have decreased, and that, at the same time, the free-riding tendencies 
of the largest corporations, and of American banks in particular, have 
increased. The market has become too large for any one Central bank 
to control it just by disciplining its own national banks. At the 
same time, the dollar component of the market has increased rather 
than declined because of the new strength of the dollar in the 1980s. 
Thus, while the Fed is too small to control the market, other central 
banks do not have the liquidity creating capacity that is required to 
do so, as each currency other than the dollar represents only a small 
part of the market. However, since such a large portion of the market 
is in dollars, American domestic economic and financial events exer­
cise a disproportionate influence over it, and since economic policy 
making in the U.S. has acquired a highly uncertain and oscillatory 
nature, these oscillations reberberate through the transnational 
financial market with effects which cannot but frighten the observer.
The increasing heterogeneity of transnational finance also leads 
to highly differentiated behaviour. American large banks, facing a 
very competitive environment at home, and the perpetual need to look 
after their shares performance on Wall Street by showing good balance 
sheets every quarter, tend to behave very differently from continental 
European banks, which do not have such problems. Since international 
lending has become very regionalised, with U.S. banks specializing in 
Latin American loans and German banks in Eastern Bloc loans, while 
Japanese banks prevail on the Pacific Basin, the behaviour of the 
banks of the leading regional nation prevails in the management of 
loans to that region. In the Polish debt crisis for instance, German 
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into a desperate corner. They were allowed by German Law to make 
almost unlimited, tax deductible provisions for those debts, and they 
had to protect an enormous flow of German trade to Eastern Europe. 
German share holders, moreover, traditionally react in a very positive 
way to a bank making itself as strong as possible, as they are less 
dividend minded than the institutional investors who prevail in the 
U.S. As a result, and in spite of the more militant stand taken by 
U.S. banks, the Polish debt crisis, and in general the Eastern Euro­
pean debt crisis, has been very effectively defused. German prestige 
in the area has consequently risen so high that it has taken the com­
bined efforts of the Soviet Union and of the United States to prevent 
a very remarkable rapprochement between Germany, the GDR, Bulgaria, 
Roumania and Hungary.
Things have been very different in Latin America, where U.S. and 
British banks lead traditionally. In this area we have noticed a much 
tougher stand being taken by creditors. European and Japanese banks 
have tended here to toe the line set by U.S. banks. This tougher 
stance must be seen in the context of the domestic American banking 
situation. U.S. main lenders to Latin America are four or five large 
U.S. banks, and some of them are very keen to unblock funds to invest 
them in the U.S. consumer credit market, where recent deregulation has 
increased their competitive powers. In addition, and this is a 
consideration of general value, recent and not so recent events, like 
the troubles of Franklin National, Chrysler, Continental Illinois, 
have shown in the last ten years that if the troubles of a company are 
large enough, and the company is large enough that its failure would 
disturb the U.S. financial market, the American authorities will go to 
the rescue, and use public money to solve private problems. But these 
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the last minute, just before the situation becomes explosive, other­
wise the U.S. public might not be frightened and agree to the use of 
vast sums of public money which are involved.
Of course, going every time t£ the edge involves the risk that 
one may eventually go over the edge. But these are the very risks 
involved in extensive transnationalization of international financial 
relations. It carries with it the problem that microeconomic beha­
viour, perverted by the hope of being rescued if real distress occurs, 
will induce imbalances too serious for the system to bear without 
breaking up.
Since these considerations are made not only by a humble econo­
mist like me, but also by the financial authorities of Europe and 
Japan, and by a number of influential law-makers, economists and 
financiers in the U.S., one can very clearly detect a rather desperate 
attempt to revert from the transnational model of financial relations 
to the international one to as wide an extent as possible and before a 
conflagration of major dimension occurs.
If this conflagration, however, occurs, the transition to the 
international model will be immediate and total.
These are the reasons why I said at the start that I think the 
pendulum will swing back to international relations. It was an 
Italian, Giovanbattista Vico, who invented cyclical history. You will 
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